The coordination of wheat and corn price controls by Shepherd, Geoffrey
Volume 27
Number 330 The coordination of wheat and corn price
controls
Article 1
June 1944
The coordination of wheat and corn price controls
Geoffrey Shepherd
Iowa State College
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station Publications at Iowa State
University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station) by
an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shepherd, Geoffrey (1944) "The coordination of wheat and corn price controls," Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home
Economics Experiment Station): Vol. 27 : No. 330 , Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin/vol27/iss330/1
June, 1944 Research Bulletin 330 
The Coordination of 
Wheat and Corn Price 
. Controls 
. By GEOFFREY SHEPHERD 
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE 
AND MECHANIC ARTS 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SUBSECTION 
RURAL SOCIAL SCIENCE SECTION 
AMES, IOWA 
CONTENTS 
PAGE 
Summary 343 
Introduction .................................. ~ . . . . . .. 345 
Causes of variations in the quantities of wheat fed ....... , 346 
Influence of CCC loans on wj-wat prices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 350 
Measures to prevent the accumulation of wheat in storage .. 351 
1. Reduce wheat production. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 352 
2. Provide permanent subsidies to wheat feeding. . . . .. 354 
3. Reduce loan rates for wheat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 355 
4. Vary wheat loan rates inversely with the 
~ze of the crop ........................... 356 
Varying rates would stabilize wheat incomes. . . .. 356 
Varying rates would promote wheat feeding. . .. 360 
Varying- rates would reduce wheat 
stabilization costs.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 362 
Relations between domestic wheat prices and 
foreign demand and supplies ..... .'. . . . . . . .. 363 
Appendix ............................... .. . ....... 369 
. SUMMARY 
Froin July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943, about 315 million 
bushels of wheat were fed to livestock in the United States. "For 
the following year (1943-44) it is estimated that 370 million 
bushels of domestic wheat will be fed, plus 100 million bushels 
of imported wheat. This is primarily a war phenomenon. In 
ordinary times, about a quarter of the wheat crop used to be 
exported. During the 1930's, however\ exports of wheat declined, 
and the quantities of wheat fed to livestock increased. 
After the war and the immediate postwar period, will United 
States wheat exports return to their 1920-30 levels, or will less 
wheat be exported and more fed? Will wheat become more and 
more a competitor with corn as a feed for livestock? 
The answer depends chiefly upon the price, subsidy and 
production policies that are adopted for wheat. 
The price of wheat in the United States is determined pri-
marily by the Commodity Credit Corporation loan rate for 
wheat. Under present legislation and administrative rulings, 
CCC loans on wheat and corn are to be made at 85 percent of 
1909-14 parity, up to and including the 1946 crop. If these 
rates are maintained, the wheat loan rate per bushel will continue 
to be 38 percent higher than the corn loan rate per bushel, in 
the same relation as the 1909-14 per bushel prices of .wheat and 
corn. While the prices of wheat and corn remain at loan rate 
levels, wheat prices will remain about 38 percent above corn 
prices, and only a small quantity of wheat will be fed to live-
stock or exported unless that feeding or exporting is subsidized. 
The rest would accumulate in storage, until in a few years the 
limits of storage capacity would be reached. Drastic action 
would then be necessary. 
During the war the demand for livestock feed is great and 
the situation is being kept in hand, to the national advantage, 
by subsidizing the feeding of wheat to livestock. About 275 
million bushels of the 315 million fed in 1942-43 were thus sub-
sidized. The total amount of the subsidy required to move this 
wheat into livestock feeding channels was 88 million dollars. 
This amount is small compared with other wartime expendi-
tures. But after the war is over, subsidies of this magnitude 
would be open to question. Wheat loans at 85 percent of parity 
will keep wheat prices above the levels at which wheat will move 
into livestock feeding or export channels of its own accord. 
What should be done then to keep excessive storage stocks from 
accumulating? 
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The alternatives appear to be four in number: 
1. Keep wheat loans at 85 percent of parity but reduce 
wheat production about 150 million bushels on the average to 
domestic human food requirements, a nominal amount fed on 
farms where grown, and seed. It is not certain, however, that 
this objective 'could be attained, unless stronger measures are 
adopted than those that, were used by the AAA before the war; 
and stronger measures may not be desirable. ' 
2. Keep wheat loan rates at 85 percent of parity, and sub-
sidize wheat feeding or exports or both, to the extent on the 
average of about 150 million bushels. There is no economic justi-
fication for this policy in peacetime. Taxpayers are likely to be 
unwilling to continue the subsidy then, and growers of other 
feeds would object to subsidized competition from wheat. 
3. Reduce the loan rate for wheat to about the same level in 
dollars and cents per bushel as the loan rate for corn. This 
would mean that if the loan rate for corn were set at 100 percent 
of parity, the loan rate for wheat would be only 72.6 percent of 
parity. If the loan rate for corn were set at 85 percent of parity, 
as it is- now, the loan rate for wheat would be only 61.7 percent 
of parity. This would not be low enough to enable wheat to be 
exported without subsidy, but it would enable most of the 150 
million bushels of wheat to be fed without subsidy. 
4. Use a loan rate for wheat that would vary inversely and 
proportionally with the size of the wheat crop. This would 
stabilize incomes to wheat growers (the present stable loan rates 
result in unstable incomes-incomes that fluctuate directly with 
the size of the crop). With a varying loan rate, in years of 
large wheat crops the loan rate and price of wheat would be 
lower than in years of average or small wheat crops, and wheat 
would move into livestock feeding and pe:r:haps into export 
channels, with a minimum amount of subsidy, or none at all. 
If the varying wheat rates averaged about 80 percent of 
the percentage of parity that was used for corn, thus running 
about 10 percent higher in dollars and cents per bushel than 
the corn loan rate, probably no subsidy would be necessary for 
feeding. With a corn loan rate at 85 percent of parity, the 
wheat loan rates would average about 70 percent of parity. 
This alternative involves some complications, and widespread 
public discussion would be necessary before it would be generally 
understood. 
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The Coordination of Wheat and 
Corn Price Controls 1 
By GEOFFREY SHEPHERD 
About 315 million bushels of wheat were fed to livestock 
during the wheat year from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943. The 
estimate for 1943-44 is 370 million bushels of domestic wheat, 
plus 100 million bushels of imported wheat.2 The average size 
of the wheat crop in the United States is about 800 million bush-
els. Thus, in 1942-43 more than a third (40 percent) of an 
average wheat crop was fed to livestock; and in 1943-44, nearly 
one half of an average crop probably will be fed, exclusive of 
the quantities of imported wheat that will be fed. 
This is primarily a 'war phenomenon, but not entirely so. The 
quantities of wheat fed to livestock have been increasing for 
many years before the present war began. The. quantitie~ fed 
to livestock each year since 1909 are shown in table 1 and fig. 1. 
They show an upward trend since about 1920. There was a 
pronounced expansion in wheat feeding during the dep'ression 
that began in 1929, and a secondary peak in 1937 and in 1938 
when wheat crops were large. War evidently is not the only 
thing that causes .large quantities of wheat to be fed. Ordinary 
peacetime events, such as depressions and large wheat crops, 
have also had the same effect, and the trend seems to be upward. 
Will this upward trend continue in the future after the war is 
over? Will wheat become more and more of a competitor with 
1 Project 832 of the low" Agricultural Experiment Station, Ames, Jowa. 
Acknowledgments are due R. R. Renne and 111. H. SaunderRon of lIfontana Stnte 
College, J. S. Davis of Stanford Uni\'ersity, R. l<l. Post of tho Bureau of Agricul· 
tural Economics, USDA, and John A. Hopkins and D. Gale Johnson of Iowa State 
College. 
2 Estimates by Bureau of Agricultural EcollOmicB. 
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Fig. 1. Wheat Fed to Livestock, 1909·42. 
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corn, not in its traditional role of a human food but in the role 
of a.livestock feed? .. 
The purpose of this bulletin is to attempt to answer these 
questions. The first step in arriving at the answers is to deter-
mine just what it is that has caused changes in the quantities of 
wheat fed to livestock in the past. That will pave the way for 
estimating what is likely to happen in the future. 
CAUSES OF VARIATIONS IN THE QUANTITIES 
OF WHEAT FED 
Under ordinary circumstances, wheat is worth about 10 
percent more per bushel, as a feed for livestock, than corn.3 
It should be ground for best results. This costs from 5 to 8 
cents per bushel, and brings the net feeding value of a bushel" 
of wheat (minus the cost of grinding) to about 2 to 5 percent 
more than the feeding value of a bushel of corn. In terms of 
dollars and cents at ordinary peacetime prices, this would make 
wheat worth from 1 to 3 cents per bushel more than corn. This 
difference is ignored in the rest of this bulletin, and wheat is 
treated as if it had the same feeding value as corn, partly because 
the difference is small, and partly because it may be more or less 
completely offset by the inertia of feeders who ordinarily regard 
wheat as a human food rather than as a feed for livestock. 
3 Statement by C. C. Culbertson, Animal Production Sullsection, Iowa Agr. Exp. 
Station. This is the value for feeding to hogs. The value ,Iepends upon the rolative 
costs of carbohydrate and protein feeds, since wheat runs higher in protein contont 
than corn. 
Whent is worth no more than corn for feeding to cattle or lambs, but is " good 
fced for poultry. 
~ A I, 
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Fig 2. Net Exports of Wheat from the United States. 1899.1941. 
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TABI,F. 1. WIIF.AT: U. S. PRODUCTION, NET EXPORTS, AN!), QUA~TITIES 
FED TO LIVESTOCK AND CONSU:lfED AS FOOD., 1899·1942.* 
Quantities Wheat red 
I Net exports 
fed to live· 
on farms Total Wheat 
Year Production year begin- stock on other than wheat used for farms fed to human 
ning July where pro· where livestock food 
duced grown I 
(1000 bu.) (1000 bu.) I 
I 
(1000 bu.) 
1899 658,534 190,749 
1900 599,315 220,723 
1901 762,546 239,137 
I 1902 686,959 208,016 1903 663,115 124,926 
1904 555,571 43,612 I 
1905 706,026 100,849 I 1906 740,509 150,594 
1907 628,764 166,304 
1908 642,818 115,901 
1909 683,379 88,465 21,037 
1910 625,476 70,164 22,778 
1911 618,166 78,447 35,267 
1912 730,011 143,938 23,687 
1913 . 751,101 146,306 36,244 
1914 897,487 335,162 27,633 
1915 1,008,637 239,591 28,755 
1916 634,572 181,067 38,220 
1917 619,790 ,102,775 31,152 
1918 904,130 276,615 36,869 I 
1919 952,097 216,671 36,863 
1920 843,277 312,625 20,649 
1921 818,964 265,590 32,984 
1922 846,649 205,079 48,969 
1923 759,482 131,892 69,670 
1924 800,877 254,695 55,727 
1925 668,700 92,669 28,214 
1926 832,213 205,994 34,261 
1927 875,059 190,578 44,507 
1928 914,373 142,301 56,566 
1929 800,649 140,361 58,769 
1930 886,470 112,435 157,188 20,893 178,081 488,170 
1931 941,674 123,774 173,991 14,421 188,412 485,381 
1932 756,927 32,284 ·124,912 17,241 142,153 493,916 
1933 551,683 25,u08 72,261 26,911 99,172 450,099 
1934 526,393 3,602 83,700 27,043 110,743 462,918 
1035 626,344 30,709 83,168 16,455 99,623 471,707 
1936 626,766 26,340 88,272 23,787 112,059 479,517 
1937 875,676 103,633 112,860 20,180 133,040 475,831 
1938 ~ 931,702 106,161 125,501 ! 35,417 161,008 486,531 1939 751,435 43,844 91,487 23,991 115,478 485,581 1940 812,374 29,533 98,622 11,342 109,964 490,511 1911 965,937 97,984 
* USDA Agricultural Statistics, 1942, pp. 9, 17 find 19. 
The quantities of wheat fed to livestock have been increas· 
ing, but not because of any increase in the production of wheat, 
either in absolute terms or relative to corn production. The 
trends of wheat production and corn production in the United 
States since 1920, exclusive of the years since 1941 when the 
United States became involved in war, are both practically 
horizon tal. t 
Important changes have been taking place, however, in the 
disposition of the wheat. Table 1 and fig, 2 show what has Deen 
happening, 'fhe quantities of wheat used for human food in the 
4USDA Agricultural Statistics, 1942, pp. 9 and 54. 
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United States vary very little from year to year, but the quanti-
ties exported have declined drastically. They amounted to about 
one-third of the crop during the first few years of the century, 
and again during and just .after the first World War. From that 
time on, however, they declined to about one-quarter or one-fifth 
of the crop during the 1920's; and they were actually negative 
(there were sman net imports) in 1936-37. Since the trend of 
wheat production has remained horizontal, the decline in exports 
has increased the quantities of wheat available for domestic 
consumption, and this has made it physically possible to feed 
more wheat to livestock. It has also depressed the domestic price 
of wheat, and made it economically possible to feed more wheat. 
'fhe close relation between the relative prices" of wheat and 
corn, and the quantity of wheat fed to livestock, is shown in 
table 2 and fig. 3. There is a similar but less close relation be-
5 Throughout this bulletin, wh~at or corn prices mean pri(~es per bushel. 
TABJ,E 2. QUANTiTIES Ol~ WHEA'r FED TO LIVES'rOCK ON FARMS 
WHERE IT WAS GROWN, AND RET,ATION BETWEEN CORN 
AND WHEAT PRICES. 
Year 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1019 
1920 
1921 
1922 
192:l 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
.193R 
1939 
1940 
1941 
I 
I 
Wheat fed 
to livestock * 
21,037 
22 1778 
35,267 
23,687 
36,244 
27,633 
28,755 
38,220 
31,152 
36,869 
36,863 
20,649 
1!2,984 
48,969 
69,670 
55,727 
28,214 
34,261 
44,507 
56,56G 
58,769 
157,188 
173,991 
124,912 
72,261 
83,700 
83,168 
88,272 
112,860 
125 1 591 
91,487 
98,622 
97,984 
* On farms where produced. 
I 
U.s. farm 
price of wheat 
44.1 
90.8 
86.9 
80.7 
79.4 
97.4 
96.1 
143.4 
204.7 
205.0 
216.3 
182.6 
103.0 
96.6 
92.6 
124.7 
143.7 
121.7 
119.0 
99.8 
103.6 
67.1 
39.0 
38.2· 
74..1 
848 
83.2 
102.6 
96.3 
56.1 
69.2 
68.2 
95.6 
I u. S. farm I l)rice of corn 
61.6 
51.6 
68.0 
55.3 
70.4 
70.8 
68.0 
116.6 
145.9 
152.2 
151.3 
61.8 
25.3 
74.5 
82.5 
106.1 
69.9 
74.5 
85.0 
84.0 
79.9 
59.6 
32.0 
31.9 
52.2 
81.5 
65.5 
104.4 
51.8 
48.7 
I 56.7 
I 61.8 70.9 
Source: USDA Agricult';ralStatistics, 1942, pp. 9, 17 and 54. 
Wheat price 
lninus corn 
price 
37.5 
39.2 
18.9 
25.4 
9.0 
26.6 
28.1 
268 
58.8 
52.8 
65.0 
120.8 
50.7 
22.1 
10.1 
18.6 
73.8 
47.2 
34.0 
15.8 
23.7 
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Fig. 3. Relation Between the Quantity> of 'Vhe"t Fed and the Difference Be· 
tween When t and Corn Prices. ' 
tween the relative sizes of the crops and the Quantities of wheat 
fed. This figure shows that the wheat fed to livestock on farms 
where grown does not fall below 20 million bushels, no matter 
how much the price of wheat exceeds thc price of corn. As the 
two prices approach equality, however, the quantities of wheat 
fed on farms where grown rise sharply, to as much as 175 million 
. bushels. 
The prices of wheat and corn, used in fig. 3 are the average 
prices at the farm for the United States as a whole. The price 
surfaces for these two products, however, differ from one an-
other. They are both basin shaped, but the lowest points of the 
two basins lie in different parts of the country. When the United 
States average farm prices are equal, the price of wheat in the 
heavy corn-producing (and consuming) areas is from 10 to 15 
cents higher than the price of corn in those areas. 
In August 1943, when the farm price of wheat was 18 cents 
higher than the farm price of corn for the United States as a 
whole, it was only 15 cents higher than. corn in Kansas; but it 
was 25 cents higher in the West North Central Division (Min-
nesota, Iowa, Missouri. North and South Dakota, Nebraska and 
Kansas) and 48 cents higher in the East North Central Division 
(Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, lVIichigan and ·Wisconsin). 'rhus, 
when the United States farm price of wheat falls to the same 
level as the United States farm price of corn, the price of wheat 
in Kansas, for example, is lower than the price of corn, and 
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some wheat is fed there. But the price of wheat in Iowa is still 
higher than the price of corn, and very little wheat will be fed 
there unless the price declines further or the feeding of wheat 
is subsidized. 
INFLUENCE OF CCC LOANS ON WHEAT PRICES 
In a free price economy, wheat prices are set by competitive 
forces at the level that moves all of the wheat produced into 
consumption. But since 1938, wheat prices have not been free. 
They have been largely controlled by the non-recourse loans 
made by the cce.6 'rhe level at which these loan rates were set 
has had a controlling influence upon the disposition of the wheat 
that is not used for domestic human consumption. 
Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the ecc 
was directed to make loans on wheat whenever the price was 
below 52 percent of parity "at rates not less than 52 per centum 
and not more than 75 per centum of the parity price of wheat at 
the beginning of the marketing year."7 
The same range of rates was applied to cotton. The eec was 
also directed to make loans on corn at rates ranging from 52 
to 75 percent of parity, but the rate within that range was deter-
mined by the size of the crop according to a schcdule laid down 
in the law. The rates in this schedule ranged from 75 percent 
of parity for a corn crop which did not exceed a normal year's 
consumption and exports, down to 52 percent of parity for a 
crop which exceeded a normal year's consumption and exports 
by more than 25 pereent.s 
For the first 3 years of the wheat program, from 1938 to 
1D40, the loan rates for wheat were set close to the bottom of the 
prescribed range of 52 to 75 percent of parity. The corn loan 
rate, however, was set close to or at the top of the range; the 
corn crops in those years were only a little larger than normal. 
The loan rate for wheat in 1938, 193D and 1940 was only from 
2 to 4 cents a bushel higher than the corn loan rates. The loan 
rates for wheat and corn, for each of these 3 years, in per-
centages of parity and in cents per bushel, are shown in the 
upper half of table 3. 
In May 1941, however, Congress passed Public Law 74, which 
directed the cce to make loans on all the "basic" crops (cotton, 
corn, wheat, rice and tobacco) at a single percentage figure--85 
percent of parity. This meant that the loan rate for wheat had 
to be 38 percent higher than the loan rate for corn-the same 
BFor brevity, the initials of the Commodity Credit Corporation and of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration are ,,,,,d henceforth, instead of the full 
names. 
7 Public Law 430-75th Congress, Chap. 30-3rd Session, E. R. 8505. P. 14, 
Sec. 302 (b). 
SThe schedule is given in full in footnote 17, page 357. 
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TABLE 3. BAsra LOAN RATES FOR WHEAT AND CORN, 1938·1943. 
Basic loan rate Basic loan rate 
Percentage by 
which the wheat 
Year in % of parity in cents per bu. rate in cents per bu. exceeded the 
Wheat I Corn Wheat I Corn* corn loan rate in cents per bu. 
1938 crop 52 70 I 59 57 3.5 1939 crop 55 70 61 57 7.0 
1940 crop 57 75 
I 
64 61 4.9 
1941 crop 85 85 98 74.8 31.0 
1942 crop· 85 85 114 84 35.7 
1943 crop 85 85 123 90 36.6 
* The loan rates for corn originally were the rates for the "commercial corn 
area"-roughly, the Corn Belt-where the average l>roduction of corn per farm 
exceeded 400 bushels. (The rates outside of this area Were made at 75 percent of 
the rate within the area.) These rates for the commercial corn area, from 1938 to 
1941, were actually set higher than the legislation specified; they were set at the 
I,ercentages of parity specified in the law, but the percentages used were the per· 
centage. of United State. parity, not, as they shOUld have been, the percentages 
of "commercial corn Mea parity," which ran .everal cents lower than United States 
parity. This error was rectified in the 1942 loan rate, and the distinction between 
the loan rates inside and outside of the commercial corn area was abolished. 
The wheat and corn loan rates given in the table are the rates announced ench 
year. The loans made sometimes averaged out a fraction of a cent to as much 
as several cent. above or below the announced rate, due to varillUons in the kinds 
and grades of wheat placed under loan. Data from The Wheat Situation, the 
~'eed Situation, and R. E. Post, of the Bureau of AgricultUral Economics, USDA. 
relation that existed between the two prices ill 1909-14. The 
loan rates for wheat were accordingly set on that basis from 
1941 on. . 
The combination of high loan rates for wheat and big crops 
of wheat from 1941 on caused very large stocks of wheat to 
accumulate. By July 1, 1942, the year-end stocks of wheat in 
the United States amounted to 630 million bushels. Storage 
stocks were so large, and the demand for livestock feed by that 
time was so great that Congress authorized the CCC to sell 125 
million bushels of wheat for feeding purposes at not less than 
85 percent of corn parity (83 cents a bushel at the time). This 
amounted to a subsidy of 31 cents a bushel, plus freight (the 
loan rate for wheat being $1.14). Early in 1943, 100 million 
bushels more were made available, at 100 percent of corn parity, 
Additional quantities were authorized later on. Of the 315 
million bushels of wheat fed from JUly 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943, 
275 million bushels were subsidized, involving a loss by the CCC 
of 88 million dollars.D The year-end stocks of wheat on July 1, 
1943 (618 million bushels) were only 2 percent smaller than 
their all-time peak reached a year earlier, but they are expected 
to be reduced below 300 million bushels by July I, 1944. 
MEA.SURES TO PREVENT THE ACCUMULA.TION 
OF WHEAT IN STORAGE 
During the war the demand for livestock feed is great, and 
the total amount of the subsidy required to move wheat into 
U Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1 !l43, p. 57. 
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livestock feeding channels is small compared with other wartime 
expenditures. But after the war is over, this subsidy method 
would be open to question. 'Wheat loans at 85 percent of parity 
would keep wheat prices above the levels at which wheat will 
move into livestock feeding or export channels of its own accord. 
'What should be done then to prevent unsaleable surpluses of 
wheat from accumulating? . There are four chief alternatives to 
choose from. 
1. REDUCE WHEAT PRODuO'rION 
One alternative would be to maintain wheat and corn loans 
at 85 percent of parity in each case, but reduce wheat production 
to domestic human consumption plus the small amounts of wheat 
that would be fed to livestock at those loan rates. 
The domestic human consumption of wheat in the United 
States averages a little less than 500 million bushels per year. 
Seed requirements take about 75 million. Over the 12 years 
from 1930 to 1941, while the farm price of wheat has averaged 
about 25 percent higher than the farm price of corn, the total 
wheat fed to livestock has averaged about 125 million bushels; 
however, fig. 3 indicates that if wheat and corn loan rates 
were kept at 85 percent of parity, only about 75 million bushels 
would be fed. 'rhis quantity plus the domestic human consump-
tion, and seed, would total about '650 million bushels. 
If wheat production were reduced to that figure (650 million 
bushels) on the average, all of the wheat would be consumed 
domestically, without requiring any subsidy. 
Is this alternative desirable from the, national point of 
view? And if so, is the objective of reducing wheat production 
to 650 million bushels attainable? 
There are some grounds for reducing agricultural production 
during depressions or other periods of temporarily reduced de-
mands, but reducing production as a continuing policy is a 
different matter. Furthermore, even if this policy were. gener-
ally acceptable, it docs not seem in fact to be attainable as a 
practical matter. At least, under the procedures used in the 
past, the AAA was not able to reduce wheat production in the 
United States. After 8 years of aggressive attempts by the 
AAA to reduce wheat production, the net results were small, as 
shown in table 1 and fig. 4. Wheat acreage was reduced to some 
extent after 1938, but high yields, not due to good weather until 
after 1941,10 offset this reduction. During most of this period, 
when wheat loans were made, the loan rate ranged between only 
52 and 57 percent of parity. It would be still more difficult to 
reduce wheat production if wheat loans were kept at 85 percent 
10 Breimyer, Haroll! R., "An Anlllysis of Crop Yields in Relation to Production 
Goals for Agriculture." Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 'Vnshington, D. C., July 
19.12. Mimeographed. 
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tion, 1900·1!J42. (Tho 1!Jl!l-41 data are given on p. 16, March·Aprii 1!J43 Wheat 
Situation, USDA. DMa for other years direct from ·the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics.) 
of parity, as they have been since 1941. Canada has had some-
what greater success than the United States in reducing wheat 
acreage, but only because she used two measures~low wheat 
prices, and diversion of wheat acreage to feed crops~tl1at would 
not be welcomed in the United States.l1 It appears likely that 
wheat production will not be reduced much in the United States, 
with loan rates at 85 pereent of parity, unless more drastic 
methods are used than those that have so far been adopted. 
11 H. S. Patton. Wartime \Vhcat Policy in Canada. Journal of Farm Econom. 
ics, Vol. XXIV, No.4, November 1942. Pl'. 788·790. 
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2. PROVIDE PERMANENT SUBSIDIES TO WHEAT FEEDING 
If wheat production were left unregulated, it probably would 
average about 800 million bushels or more, as it has in the past.12 
This would leave about 200 million bushels to be fed to livestock, 
or exported . 
. During the war, as shown above, the feeding of wheat to 
livestock has becn subsidized, to the extent of several hundred 
million bush cIs. This has raised thc question whether the feed-
ing of wheat to livestock should not bc promoted by a program 
of continuous subsidy as a pcrmanent institution after the war. 
Perhaps a two-price system should be used-a high price for 
wheat for human food, and a lower price, at about feed price 
lcvels, for wheat for feeding to livestock. 
Two-price systems, based upon the different uses to which 
differ'ent parts of the products are put, have been used with a 
number of farm products. The most conspicuous case is milk. 
In most largc city milk sheds the part of a producer's milk that 
is devoted to the highest use-fluid milk-is paid for at a price 
cquivalent to fluid milk prices, and the rest, the "surplus" milk, 
is paid for at a lowcr price, equivalent to the lower uses such as 
butter, icc cream, etc., to which the surplus is put. Cannot 
wheat producers ask for a similar two-price system, based on thc 
two different uses-human food and livestock feed-to which 
wheat is put 113 
The two-price system now in effect for wheat, by which thc 
feeding of wheat to livestock is subsidized by Federal funds, is 
clearly advantageous as a war measure by comparison with a 
single price system at 85 pcrcent of wheat parity. It could be 
employed in peacetime as a step toward lower prices. But 
there appears to be no other economic justification for it. Two-
price systems are justified for milk/! but not because the milk 
is put to two different uses. 'rIwy are justified for an" entir.ely 
different· reason, not rclatcd to demand or prices at all, but to 
costs. It costs a farmer more to meet the sanitary specifications 
for the production of fluid milk than for thc production of milk 
for other purposes/5 and sufficient fluid milk for the milk shed 
12 The distribution of wheat yields is asymmetrical. lIfost of the crops rail 
between 800 and 900 million bushels in size; only One exceeds a billion bushels 
(und that, by less than 1 percent) hut two fall in the 500 and four in the 600·650 
,million bushel group. See 'Vhcat Studies, Vol. XX No.1, Sept. 1943, p. 3, Food 
Research Institute, Stanford University. 
13 For" statement concerning a two·price system for wheat, see Earl O. Heady, 
Wartime Farm and li'ood Policy. Memo No.2. "Wheat for Food and Feed," lawn 
State College, April 8, 1943. JlIimeographed. 
14They are p088ible because of the monopoly position of" the milk producers in 
the milk shed but they are justifled for the reasons given in the next few sentences, 
15 All of the milk from a fluid milk producing farm is not necessarily sold for 
fluid milk; usually, some of it is sold as surplus milk, at approximately butterfat 
equivalent prices. But the extra costs are incurred on all the milk, fluid and 
surplus alike. 
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would not be forthcoming unless higher prices were paid for 
fluid milk than for milk for other purposes. No such cost differ-
entials are involved in producing wheat for food and feed. Such, 
cost differentials as exist between high and low quality or cleaned 
and uncleaned wheat are already reflected in market prices. 
The wartime subsidies to wheat for feeding purposes were 
purely wartime emergency measures,justifiable on no other 
grounds. In peacetime, a subsidized feeding of wheat to live-
stock would simply make meat cheaper at the expense· o~ bread. 
The producers of other £eeds-"':corn, oats, etc.-would oppose it 
bllcause it probably would lower the prices of their products. 
A subsidy to wheat, like a subsidy to any other product,would 
induce It higher production of that commodity than if no su~sid{ 
were being paid.1s Feed producers' opposition would be jus#fied 
on the grounds of national intereSlts as well as on the ground~ of 
their'own sectional interests. There seem to be no eco.l;lOmic 
grounds for the continuation of the present two-price poiicy for 
wheat as a permanent institution. . .' . > .: 'i' 
A two-price system, or any other form of subsidy, for wheltt 
exports nppears even less justifiable than a two-price system or 
other subsidy for feeding wheat to livestock. Once the need' fbr 
exporting wheat for foreign relief purposes is past, subsidizing 
exports in peacetime only increases' -foreign resentment,. as 
shown by the tariffs and other barriers that are erected in other 
countries' against them. The subsidies then do p~odu~ers in the 
United States no gqod at all. If the United States subsidizes 
wheat exports 20 cents a bushel, and the foreign .. country levies 
a .tariff of 20 cents a bushel against. the wheat in order to protect 
its own producers, the net effect oJ,l exports is zero. The Ullited 
State!! loses, however, because it· pipes 20 cents a bushel ouC 9f 
its treasury into the treasury of the foreign country. 
3. REDUCE LOAN RATES FOR WHEAT' 
If subsidies to wheat feeding are not continued, the only 
other price alternative would seem to be to reduce the loan rate 
for wheat to the point where wheat would move into livestock 
feeding or export channels of its own accord. . ., 
How great a reduction in the loan rate for wheat would be 
required for this purpose? . 
. The extent of the reduction needed to move ~heat into live-
16 It eould b. argued that· lowering the.prlce of wheat might actually increase 
'the total production of wheat .plus feed grains. In the areas where acreage could 
be di.verted easily from wheat to feed grains. and vice versa, according to changes 
In relative prices, a lowering of relative wheat prices resulting in ,. diversion of 
some wheat acreage to feeds might result in a greater increase in feeds production 
than decrease in whe"t production-that is, in an increase in tot,,1 wheat plus feed 
grains. But this does not appear very likely. In any ellRe some wheat acreage 
would also be diverted to otber than feed crops-to range purposes, for instanc,,"",,"" 
so that it seems most likely that a considerable reduction in total wheat plus feed 
grJ)ins production wo .. ld result from .. lowering of wheat prices. . 
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stock feeding depends upon the loan rate used for corn. The 
loan rate for wheat would need to be reduced, not by a certain 
amount in dollars and cents, but by a certain percentage relative 
to the loan rate for corn. 
It appears from fig. 3 that most of the 225 million bushels of 
wheat above domestic food and seed requirements would be fed 
to livestock, if the United States farm price of wheat were about 
the same as the United States farm priee of corn. 'l'he 1909-14 
base price of wheat was 88.4 eents; the corresponding price of 
corn was 64.2 cents. If the loan rate for wheat were set the 
same in dollars and cents as the loan rate for corn, it would be 
64,2 8~.4100 ~ 72.6 percent as high in terms of parity as the loan 
rate for corn. 
A few concrete examples will make this clear. If the loan 
rate for corn were set at parity, and the loan rate for wheat 
were set at the same figure in dollars and cents per bushel as 
the loan rate for corn, then that loan rate for wheat would be 
64.2 8~.4100 = 72.6 percent of parity. If the loan rate for corn 
were set at 85 percent of parity, as it is now, then a loan rate 
for wheat that would be equal in dollars and cents to the loan 
rate for corn would be 72.6 percent of 85 percent of parity; that 
is, it would be 61.7 percent of parity. 
4. VARY WHEAT LOAN RATES INVERSELY WITH 
'fHE SIZE OF THE CROP 
It is not necessary, however, to reduce the loan rate for wheat 
to 72.6 percent of the loan rate used for corn, all the time, in 
order to move the excess of wheat over domestic food consump-
tion into domestic livestock fceding. The loan rate for wheat 
could be lowered, relative to the loan rate for corn, only when 
wheat crops are large. A loan rate for wheat that varied in-
versely with the size of the crop would permit large quantities 
of wheat to be fed when wheat crops were large, but would give 
wheat growers higher prices when wheat crops were small and 
most of the. crop was needed for domestic human consumption. 
VARYING RATES WOULD STABILIZE WHEAT INCOMES 
There are other reasons why a varying loan rate for wheat-
a rate that varies inversely with the size of the crop-would be 
desirable. In the case of corn, a stable loan rate is needed, be-
cause most of the corn crop is fed to livestock, and stabilizing 
corn prices against fluctuations in production removes a major 
cause of fluctuations in livestock production and prices. But 
most of the wheat crop is sold as cash grain, and stable wheat 
prices mean unstable wheat incomes. When the price of wheat 
is held stable at a constant level, the total income to wheat farm-
3"" il, 
ers varIes from year to year, directly and proportionally with 
variations in the size of the crop. A crop 20 percent above 
average means 20 percent more gross income than average j a 
small crop means an equally small gross income. To take 3 con-
secutive years as concrete examples: The 1931 wheat crop was 
942 million bushels; the 1932 crop was 757 million; the 1933 
crop was 552. If stable loan rates had been in effect then, the 
income to wheat growers would have been only a little more 
than half as great in 1933 as it was in 1931. Stabilized wheaf 
prices would have resulted in very unstable wheat incomes. 
There is a question whether stability of incomes is desired by 
the majority of growers. The question cannot well be discussed 
extensively here, but the whole drive for price stability expressed 
in the setting up and operation of the eee appears to support 
the opinion that there is a strong desire for such stability of 
incomes, with stability of prices regarded as a step in that 
direction. 
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 provided for a 
schedule of loan rates for corn that varied inversely with the 
size of the corn crop,17 but made no such provision for wheat. 
It now appears that the opposite of that arrangement is need-
ed-stable loan rates for corn, but varying loan rates for wheat 
(loan rates that vary inversely and proportionately with the 
size of the wheat crop). 
If large and small wheat crops were accompanied by pro-
portionally low and high loan rates, the loan rates would vary 
but wheat incomes would be stabilized. A schedule of loan 
rates could be set up, varying inversely and proportionally with 
the size of the crop, similar to the schedule that was set up for 
corn in the AAA of 1938. That corn schedule, however, over-
corrected for changes in the size of crops above average size, 
and provided for no change at all for crops below average size. 
The effect on total income therefore was irregular. This is shown 
17 "The (Commodity Credit) Corporation is directed to make available loans 
upon corn during any marketing year beginning in the calendar year in which the 
November crop estimate for corn is in excess of a normal year's domestic consump. 
tion and exports, or in any mnrketing year when on November 15 the farm price of 
corn is below 75 per centum of the parit~ price, at the following rates: 
75 per centum of such parity price if such estimate does not exceed a normal 
. year', consumption and exports and the farm price of cOrn is below 75 per 
centum of the parity price on November 15; 
70 per centum of such parity price if such estimate exceeds a normal yenr's 
domestic consumption and exports by not more than 10 per centum: 
65 per centum of such parity price if such estimate exceeds a normal year's 
domestic consumption and exports by' more than 10 per centum and not more 
thnn 15 per centum; 
60 per centum of such pnrity price if such estimate exceeds a normal year's 
dom.stic consumption and exports by more than 15 per centum and not more 
than 20 per centum: 
55 per centum of such parity price if such estimate exceeds a normal year's 
domestic consumption and exports by more than 20 per centum and not more 
than 25 per centum; 
52 per centum of such parity price if such estimate exceeds a normal year's 
domestic consumption and exports by more than 25 per centum." 
Source: Public Law No. 430-75th Congress, Chap. 30-3d Session, H. R. 8505. 
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in fig. '5.18 The larger the crop above average size, the smaller 
were the gross incomes. The decrease in incomes with increas-
ing crop size was almost as great as it was under the free market 
before any program was instituted (the elasticity of the demand 
for corn under the free market was about 0.65). 
A schedule of loan rates for different average yields of wheat 
that would provide stable gross incomes is given in table 4. In 
order to keep gross incomes stable, the loan rates have to fluctu-
ate inversely but somewhat more than proportionally with the 
size of the crop. The loan rate for a crop that is 10 percent 
higher than average (that is,a crop that is 110 percent of aver-
age size) needs to be, not 90 percent of average, but 91 percent. 
The loan rate for a crop that is 80 percent of average size necds 
to be, not 120 percent of average, but 125 percent. 
The total costs of producing a large ,crop of wheat are 
slightly higher than the total costs of producing a small crop-
not much higher where the wheat is harvested with a combine, 
but somewhat higher where it is harvested with a binder. In 
order to take this into account, the schedule of wheat loan rates 
could be set so that the rates for different size crops would 
stabilize net incomes, rather than gross incomes. The rates could 
vary in the opposite direction as the size of the crop but not 
quite so much as the size of the crop. Thus the loan rate for a 
crop that was 10 percent larger than average could' be set only 
8 or 9 percent lower than the rate for an average crop, so that 
the gross income would be a little larger than the gross income 
from an average crop-enough larger to cover the additional 
expenses involved in handling the larger crop. 
It is interesting to observe that under the "free market" con-
ditions that existed in the United States before the eee beO'an 
its stabilization operations, the total revenue curvc for wl~eat 
was a straight line, almost horizontal but with a slight positive 
18 This figure is repr~duced from USDA Tech, nul. No. 826, Controlling Corn 
1\1\(} Hog SupplIes and l'rlCes, by the present allthor, 1942, p. 46. 
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slope.19 That is to say, free market wheat prices varied inversely 
and almost proportionally with the size of the wheat crop, like 
the loan rates outlined above. 
VARYING RATES WOULD PROMOTE WHEAT FEIWING 
A system of loan rates that varied with the size of the crop 
like this would remove an impediment to the use of wheat for 
feed that is at present being surmounted only at considerable 
cost of public funds. The present program of constant loan 
rates (in terms of parity) stabilizes wheat prices at a level about 
38 percent higher than ,the level of corn prices, because wheat 
prices in the 1909-14 base pcriod were 38 percent higher than 
corn prices (88~4~/oO 138). The only way to bridge the gap 
between whcat and corn prices supported by loans at those 
levels is by a governmClit subsidy almost as big as the gap. Ex-
tremely short corn crops, as in 1934 and 1936, or an abnormally 
strong demand for feeds, as in 1943, may narrow the gap by 
raising corn prices above the corn loan rate, and reduce the sub-
sidy to that extent; but ordinarily the price of wheat would 
remain about 38 percent higher than the price of corn. In this 
situation, stocks of wheat are likely to continue to accumulate, 
and the only way to dispose of them is for the government to 
subsidize wheat, either for feeding, at prices comparable with 
corn prices, or for cxport, at probably still lower prices than 
corn prices. This constant loan rate policy is bound to continue 
the burden of over-large storage' stocks, or require continuous 
government subsidies to get rid of them" or some of both. This 
would remain truc even if the constant loan rate for wheat were 
lowered relative to the corn loan rate, unless it were lowered all 
the way to 'equality with the corn loan rate. 
The present system of constant loan rates for whcat and corn 
inhibits the feeding of wheat to livestock by keeping wheat prices 
about 38 percent above corn prices. A'system of loan rates for 
wheat that varied inversely with the size of the wheat crop 
would bridge or at least narrow the gap between the prices of 
wheat and corn whenever the wheat crop was large, and promote 
the feeding of wheat with the minimum of subsidy or perhaps 
with no subsidy at all. 
If the linc of relationship in fig. 3 between the price of wheat 
(relative to the price of corn) and the quantities of wheat fcd 
to livestock were straight, the varying loan rates for wheat would 
need t.o average about the same in dollars and eent.s as the loan 
rate for corn, in order to move all the wheat into consumption. 
The loan rates in that case would average abollt 72.6 percent of 
whatever percentage of parity was used for corn. But fig. 3 
ID Preliminary unpuhlished price analysis made hy R. E. Post, Bureau of Agri. 
cultural Economics, USDA, 
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shows that the line of relationship is curved, concave from above. 
This means that the varying loan ra.tes for wheat could average 
higher than 72.6 percent of the loan rate for corn. 
They could not, however, average as high as 100 percent of 
the percentage of parity used for corn. The production of wheat 
averages about 800 million bushels per year. Only once (in 
1915) has wheat production reached 1,000 million bushels (125 
percent of average). Thus, only once would the varying loan 
rate (varying inversely and proportionally with the size of the 
crop) have fallen as low as 80 percent of the percentage of 
parity used for corn. The loan rate would need to be as low as 
72.6 percent of the percentage of parity used for corn in order 
to move 225 million bushels of wheat (the difference between 575 
million bushels for food and seed, and the 800 million bushel 
average production) into livestock feeding. The rate would have 
to be lower yet to move 425 million bushels (the difference be-
tween 575 million bushels and 1,000 million bushels). But the 
loan rate for a 1,000 million bushel crop would be only 80· per-
cent of the percentage of parity used for corn. 
rfhe varying loan rates for wheat, therefore, could average 
above 72.6 percent of the same percentage of parity that was 
used for the corn loan rate, but would have to average substan-
tially below 100 percent of the corn rate percentage. It is diffi-
cult to determine exactly the percentage that should be used, 
because the curve in fig. 3 is nearly vertical where the price 
of corn is only a few cents below the price of wheat; but perhaps 
80 percent would be about right. Thus, with the corn loan rate 
at 85 percent of parity, as it is now, the wheat loan rate should be 
80 1~OH5 = 68 percent of parity. rfhis figure could be rounded 
off for practical purposes at 70 percent. As nearly as can be 
determined, wheat loan rates that varied (inversely and propor-
tionally with the size of the crop) about this level-70 percent 
of parity-would move all the wheat produced into consumption 
as human food and livestock feed. 
·When the wheat crop is large, so that a considerable propor-
tion of it could be fed, how likely is it that the corn crop would 
be large also? 
The probability that large (or small) crops of corn and wheat 
would come at the same time is not great. The conclusions 
reached in a prcvious study may be reproduced here: 
"Examination shows that the correlation between the varia-
tions in the yiclds of corn and wheat is zero, except only for the 
positive correlation resulting from the extremely severe drouths 
of 1934 and 1936 and the extremely good weather of 1942. Fig-
ure 2 shows that if those 3 years are ignored, the correlation 
between the average yield of corn in the United States and wheat 
yields (both the spring wheat and the winter wheat) is, for all 
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practical purposes, zero. 'l'his is true of wheat yields per acre 
harvested as well as per acre seeded.20 
In addition, whenever a large crop of wheat did coincide 
with a large crop of corn, the low price for wheat would not 
coincide with a low price of corn; for the pricc of corn would 
be supported by the stable corn loan rate. 
VARYING RATES WOULD REDUCE WHEAT. STABILIZATION COSTS 
Loan rates that varied with the size of the crop would havc 
one or .two other effects, in addition to stabilizing wheat incomes 
and promoting the feeding and exporting of wheat. Stable 
loan rates involve governmental carrying over of all of the 
quantities by which large crops exceed average size. Loan rates 
varying inversely with the size of the crop would permit most 
of the excess to move into consumption at once, without requir-
ing carrying over to a latcr year of short crop. 
The demand for wheat for human food in the United States 
is very inelastic, as shown above. 'rhe items that provide elas-
ticity in the demand are exports, feeding to livestock, and the 
private demand (including the wheat growers' "demand" for 
his own wheat) for speculative storage purposes. 'rhe quanti-
ties taken by these elastic elements would all be greatcr at a 
lower price, in years of big crops, than at a constant price from 
year to year. A flexible loan rate would stimulate exports and 
feeding to livestock in years of large crops. If private specu-
lators behaved as they formerly did in the free market, they 
would carry the remainder of big crops over to small crop years. 
Governmental stabilization stocks therefore would drop to a 
nominal amount. This would greatly reduce the size and total 
cost of governmenbil wheat stabilization operations. 21 
It is impossible to estimate in advance whether an announce-
ment that the government intended to vary loan rates inversely 
and proportionally with the size of the crop would encourage 
private speculators to carry more wheat over from years of large 
crops to years of small crops than formerly. If the announce-
ment had this effect, the private speculators would bid the price 
up over the loan rate in years of good crops; they would accu-
mulate storage stocks then; and they would unload those stocks 
when crops were small, to such an extent that prices would 
fluctuate less than (~nversely) proportionally to the size of the 
20Geoffrey Shepherd and David G. Paterson. The proper size and location of 
corn stabili.ation stocks. Iowa Agr. Jo:xp. Sta. Res. Bul. 321, August 1943. p. 9. 
21 It i. estimated that when the influence of changes in the geneml price level 
is taken into account, the co.t of CCC operations in the past (including administra. 
tive expenses but excluding the effects of changes in the general price levels) have 
run at about 10 percent of the value of the loans made. (.T. B. Hutson, President, 
CCC, Address, "Looking Ahead at Our Financial Problems." USDA Mimeo., Nov. 
6, 1941.) 
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crop. The government would then find itself carrying some 
stocks from years of short crops to years of large crops. The 
stocks would not be large, but the losses per bushel would be· 
high. 
If this took place, the situation could be remedied by setting 
the lc;>an rates so that they varied less than proportionally with 
the variations in the size of the crop. This would mean that the 
program would not completely stabilize wheat growers' incomes; 
but that might be the most that could be done. 
In summary, then, a system of loan rates for wheat varying 
inversely with the yield would accomplish several things: 
1. The controlled variation in loan rates would stabilize in-
comes to·wheat growers. 
2. The low price in years of large crops would encourage 
exports and feeding to livestock at low prices. This would pro-
mote the feeding and export of wheat with a minimum of sub-
sidization. 
3. The inverse correlation between consumption and prices 
would permit the carrying of much smaller stabilization stocks. 
This reduction in the number of bushels stored would tend to 
reduce the cost of the stabilization program j but this tendency 
might be partly offset by higher losses per bushel if private 
speculators increased their storage operations over their previous 
free market scale. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN DOMESTIC WHEAT PRICES 
AND FOREIGN DEMAND AND SUPPLIES 
The price of corn in the United States is determined by the 
supply and demand for corn in the United States as a whole. 
It would obviously be useless for Illinois to try to control the 
price of corn at Chicago over a period of years by a program 
confined to the state of Illinois alone. It would simply pile up 
storage stocl!:s of corn in Illinois, if the Illinois price were set 
higher than the prices in the rest of the United States, or drain 
corn out of Illinois, if the Illinois price were set too low. Yet 
that is the sort of thing that the United States has been doing, 
on a broader geographical scale, with wheat. It has been con-
ducting a program for cQntrolling the price, production and 
consumption of wheat in the United States alone, on a purely 
national scale (except for some subsidized exports) when wheat 
is an international commodity, produced all over the globe and 
harvested somewhere every month of the year, as shown in fig. 6. 
Its price is determined by supply and demand in many different 
countries all over the globe, and brought to a focus at Liverpool. 
The United States produces less than one-quarter of the 
world wheat crop, even when Russia and China are not included 
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1<'ig. 6. Distribution of World Wheat Acreage and Time of Harvest. 
in the world total, and less than one·fifth when Russia is in· 
cluded.22 Thus, changes in production in the United States have 
only a comparatively small effect on the world price. They 
therefore have only a small effect on the price of wheat in the 
United States, for the United States price is ordinarily the world 
price minus shipping charges to the importing countries.~3 
Figure 7 shows that.the price of wheat at Kansas City ordinarily 
remains a shipping charge below the Liverpool price, except 
only when the United States is not exporting wheat (as in 
1934-36). Unless the United States reduces her wheat produc-
tion or increases her wheat consumption enough to stay off the 
world market, or else continuously subsidizes her wheat exports, 
the price of wheat in the United States over a period of years is 
tied to the world price. The level of wheat prices in the United 
States over a period of years is a world problem, not a domestic 
problem. 
It was shown in the preceding section that efforts to reduce 
. wheat production in the United States before the war proved 
largely unsuccessful. Wheat production could perhaps be re· 
duced if wheat prices were lowered, but production was not 
reduced below previous levels while high wheat loan rates kept 
wheat prices high. It also was shown above that the most 
feasible way to increase domestic wheat consumption is to feed 
more wheat to livestock, and that this requires either subsidizing 
(which is unjustified in peacetime) or reducing the price of 
22 USDA Agricultural Statistics, 1942, p. 16. 
23 Tbese shipping charges vary from time to time, for several reasons. In 
years of large wheat exports from the United States the totlll shipping charges arc 
higher than in years of small exports, becauso the exporters have to reach farther 
into the country to get their larger supplies. 
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Fig. 7. Wh.at: Prices lit KllnsRs City and Liverpool, and United States Sup-
plies for Export and CIITry-over, 1923-40. 
wheat to about the level of the price of corn. Finally, it was 
shown that subsidizing wheat exports is a waste of public funds. 
The remaining alternative appears to be to lower the loan 
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rate for wheat, and thus lower the price of wheat, to the point 
where wheat will either be fed to livestock, or exported. If the 
price were thus lowered,· which way would wheat move--into 
livestock feeding, or into cxport channels? 
Some light can be thrown on this question by showing what 
would have happened in the past if the loan rate for wheat had 
been set at (a) 85 percent of parity, or at (b) 85 percent of 
corn parity-that is, at the same level as the loan rate for corn 
in dollars and cents. Table 5 shows by years the actual market 
price of wheat (parcels) at Liverpool, and the computed price 
that wheat would have been at Kansas City if the United States 
farm price had been 85 percent of wheat parity and 85 percent 
of corn parity. Parity calculations are based upon United States 
average farm prices. The actual market prices at Kansas City 
averaged 13.6 cents higher than the United States farm prices 
of wheat, from 1931 to 1940, so the computed prices at Kansas 
City in table 5 were obtained by adding 13.6 cents to the com-
puted 85 percent of parity for each year. 
The table shows that in all years after 1926, if the wheat 
loans had been set at 85 percent of wheat parity, that would 
have kept prices at Kansas City higher than the price at Liver-
pool~in some cases, more than twice as high. Obviously no 
very substantial quantities of wheat would have moved into 
export under those conditions. The table also shows that wheat 
TABLE 5. ACTUAL PRICES AT'LIVERPOOL, AND co:r.rpUTED PRICES AT 
KANSAS CITY BASED ON 85 PERCENT OF WHEAT PARITY AND 
CORN PARITY. 
Year 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
... 
Actual price 
at Liverpool 
(parcels) 
176 
163 
152 
128 
129 
80 
59 
54 
68 
81 
90 
126 
124 
70 
* 
Computed ,)rices at Kan .... City 
85% of I 85% of 
whent parity • corn parity 
163.00 122.10 
162.11 121.46 
160.34 120.17 
162.11 121.46 
161.23 120.81 
155.04 116.32 
139.13 104.76 
123.22 93.21 
119.68 90.64 
127.64 96,42 
128.52 97.06 
126.85 95.78 
132.06 99.63 
125.87 95.13 
124.10 93.85 
124.98 94.49 
131.17 98.99 
Liverpool prices from USDA Agricultural Statistics 1943, I'. 22, and "arlier issues. 
* Market closed September 1939. 
From 1931 to 1940 inclusive, the price of No.2 Hard winter wheat at Kansas City 
averaged 13.6 cents higher than the United States farm price of wheat. This 
amount has been added to the computed United States parity prices each year in 
order to show what the price of wheat would have been at Kansas City ench year 
if the United States loan rate had been set at the percentages of parity specified. 
It is estimated that tbe grade of wheat represented by the Liverpool parcels 
price commands a premiUm of about 4 cents over No. 2 Hard winter wheat, the 
. grade used for the estimates of wheat prices at Kansas City. In order to m·ake the 
two prices strictly comparable, therefore, 4 cents sbould be added to the Kansas 
City prices. This adjustment bas not been made in this table. 
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loans at 85 percent of corn parity would have been more nearly 
in line with world wheat prices, but would still have been higher 
than Liverpool prices in some years. 
The present loan rate for wheat at 85 percent of parity is 
$1.23. Thus, if the storage program kept wheat prices at about 
the level of the loan rates, the price of wheat at Kansas City 
could be expected to average about $1.23 + 13.6 cents, or $1.37, 
through the 1943-44 season. If the general price level continues 
about as high as at present after the war and postwar period is 
past, it is a fair guess that Liverpool could get its wheat far 
cheaper from Canada, or from Argentina or Australia. United 
States wheat exports under that situation would be negligible. 
A loan rate for wheat at the same level in dollars and cents as 
the loan rate for corn, at present, would be about 93 cents. 
One cannot say with assurance how far out of line the first of 
these two prices would be in relation to postwar prices, or how 
nearly the second price would be in line. But an authoritative 
opinion was expressed on that subject recently in these words :24 
"Although it is quite impossible for me to indicate what the 
post-war international price of wheat will be, I ,can safely indi-
cate one of the things it will not be. I refer to the present level 
of wheat prices in the United States. I feel certain you all 
realize this just as fully as I do. In case anyone of you does 
not, I think a reference to the following minimum prices guar-
anteed at the present time by the governments of Argentina, 
Australia and Canada should be sufficient to establish the point: 
Guaranteed Minimum Price 
at Primary Markets 
Argcntina 6-% pesos per 100 kilos at 
Buenos Aires . 
Australia 4 shillings 5.73d per bushel 
on first 3,000 bushels market-
ed by each grower 
Canada 2 shillings 5.73d per bushel 
on allY quantity above 3,000 
bushels 
90 cents No. 1 Northern at 
Fort William 
Equivalent in U.S. 
cents per bushel at 
official rate of ex-
change 
54.7 
72.3 
40. 
81.8 
(End of quotation) 
24 The International 'Vheat Agreement, Statement by A. Cairns to 1\ m'eeting of 
the 'Vheat Committee of the American Farm Bureau Federation held I\t the Sher. 
mall Hotel, Chicago, Ill., Dec. 7, 1042. The United States loon rate for Wheat at 
that time WIlS $1.14 por bnshel. 
It appears evident that only if wheat loan rates were set at 
about the same level in dollars and cents as corn loan rates 
would there be much chance of exporting wheat from the United 
States without subsidy. Even under those conditions, while corn 
loan rates remain at 85 percent of parity (the minimum under 
present law up to and including the 1946 crop) it seems likely 
that wheat. would move into domestic livestock feeding rather 
than into export channels. 
It is possible that the world wheat situation after the war 
will be more favorable to exports than before the war, either 
because of the development of international wheat agreements 
among wheat producing and consuming nations/5 or because of 
the adoption by European nations of lower tariffs on wheat, as 
part of a reciprocal trade agreement, or both.2G But that is a 
whole problem in itself, to be investigated in another place. 
25 The International Wheat Agreement. USDA, Office of Foreign Agricultural 
Relations, Washington, D. C. 1942. 
J. S. Davis. New international wheat agreement •. Wheat Studies, Food Re· 
search Institute, Stanford University. November 1942. 
26 Th" lIIidcontinent and the Peace. University of Minnesota Press, lIfinne· 
apolis, Minn. 1943. 
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APPENDIX 
The operation of a system of varying loan rates for wheat would raise 
a number of administrative problems. Some of these problems are discussed 
in an exploratory manner in this appendix, not in any definitive way, but 
simply for the pnrpose of bringing them to attention. They involve some 
technical difficulties that transcend the bounds of economics. 
RELATIONS BETWEEN INITIAL AND FINAL 
WHEAT LOAN RATES 
If a system of loan rates for wheat that varied inversely and propor· 
tionally with the yield were instituted, the rate each ye.ar could not be 
determined until harvest time when tho yield would be known. But in order 
to influenee production in tho right direction as well as eonsumption, loan 
rates should be announced at least a production period ahead of time, 
before the crop is even planted. How could these two good features both 
be retained T 
This eould bo aceompIishcd by the use of two loan rates each year-the 
initial or basie rate, and the actual or final rate. Both rates would be 
eomputed separately for eaeh kind of wheat. The initial or basie rate for 
each kind of wheat would be announeed shortly before wheat seeding 
began--say August in the ,case of winter wheat, and February in the ease 
of spring wheat. This basie loan rate would be set at the level that it was 
estimated would induce the seeding of the right acreage for tho year con-
cerned. The right acreage is the acreage which, with average yields (yields 
that would result from average weather) would produce a crop that would 
all move into consumption at that loan rate. 
The actual loan rate would 110t be announced until harvest time. If the 
yield of wheat that year were average, the actual or final loan rate would 
be the same as the basic loan rate. If the yield of wheat were 10 percent 
lower than average, the actual or final loan rate would be 11 percent higher 
than tho basic loan rate, so that the total ineome per acro would be the 
same as if the yield had been average. Similarly, if the yield were 10 
pereent higher than average, the actual or final loan rate would be 11 
percent lower than average, and the total income por acre would still be 
the same as if the yield had been average. . 
If the yields of wheat on all farms varied uniformly from year to year, 
so that whon f'or example the Ullitod States average yield of wheat were 
10 percent higher than average, the yields on every wheat farm were 10 
percent hig,her than average, then each farmer eould multiply his acreage 
by the basic loan rate announced before seeding time and know just what 
Ilis gross income would be that year, regardless of' whether the yield turned 
out to be high or low. Obviously this condition-wheat yields on all farms 
varying alikc-does not exist, but it is approximated under a crop (yield) 
insurance program, such as that whieh was condueted by the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation for wheat and cotton before it was diseontinuod in 
the summer of 1943. The condition is only approximated, since under the 
program wheat yields were insured ouly up to 75 percent of average. But 
within that limitation, a combination of the varying loan rate for wheat, 
and a crop (yield) insurance program would provide wheat growers with 
something approaching a fixed income (variable downwards only by 25 
percent) known in advance, like all annual salary set in advance. It would 
vary ollly with variations in the demand for wheat. 
There is Borne hope that national and international programs for stabi-
lizing demand" at a high level will meet with some measure of success. Thus 
it is possiblo that total wheat incomes per farmer, traditionally fluctuating 
wildly from year to year with local and national variations in yield and 
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"with national and international variations in demand, could be more or less 
eompletely stabilized and' known in advance ill the fnture. 
RELATION BETWEEN WINTER AND 
SPRING WHEAT LOAN RATES 
A complicated and technical problem is involved ill setting the final loan 
rate each year. The two major kinds of wheat--winter wheat and spring 
wheat--Rre harvested at different times. The correlation between the 
fluctuations in their yields is moderately high, +0.4, but this degree of cor· 
relation results almost entirely from the concurrently high yields in the 
one year, 1942. This means that, although the basic loan rate for both 
kinds of wheat would probably be identical, the final rates-depending upon 
the yields of the two cropS-WOUld frequently differ from,each other. FIor 
example, the yield of winter wheat one year might be 20 percent higher titan 
the original basic rate, when harvesting began in June. But the yield of 
spring wheat might tUl'n out to be 20 percent lower than average when that 
crop was harvested in the late summer. The final loan rate for spring 
wheat, therefore, should. be 25 percent higher than the original basic rate. 
But the final rate for winter wlleat would be 25 percent lower than the 
original basic rate for winter wheat. Would these two rates move winter" and 
spring wheat into consumption ill the proper proportions' 
The answer depends upon the elasticity 'of substitution of the one kind 
of wheat for the other. The data presented in table 6 and :fig. 8 show that 
the elasticity of substitution of the two kinds of wheat at the two chief 
milling centers, Minneapolis and Kansas City, is about 4.0. The elasticity 
based upon farm prices is higher yet. This means that when the winter 
wheat yield per acre falls 20 percent lower than its usual relation to spring 
wheat yields, the price of winter wheat rises only 5 percent higher than its 
usual relation to the price of spring Wheat. But a loan rate f'or each kind 
of wheat that varied inversely and proportionally with the yield of each 
kind of wheat would in that situation raise the price of winter wheat 25 
percent. Millers would buy spring wheat until its price rose to 5 percent 
below the price of winter wheat. This would raise the price of spring wheat 
above its loan rate, so that very little of it would go under loan. It would 
also cause spring wheat farmers' incomes to rise. Winter wheat farmers' 
incomes would not fall, being supported by the loan rate, but all the carry-
over would consist of winter wheat, the crop ·that was short that year. This 
would be the opposite of the normal situation, where the carryover consists 
mostly of the crop that is largest. 
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TABLE 6. RELATION BETWEEN U. S. WIN'l'ER AND SPRING WHEAT 
PRODUCTION AND PRICES. 
--
Price of Price of Winter All spring Winter· No.1 No.2 Kansas 
Year wheat wheat spring Northern Hard City· prod. prod. 
ratio spring winter at Mp18. 1,000 bu. 1,000 bu. nt Mpls. Kansas ratio City 
1909 417,796 266,131 I 1.6 109 107 .98 1910 429,875 195,601 2.2 105 98 .93 
1911 428,740 189,426 2.3 107 97 .91 
1912 402,703 327,308 1.2 87 88 1.01 
1913 501,239 249,862 2.0 88 84 .95 
1914 670,945 226,542 3.0 120 105 .8R 
1915 G40,565 368,072 1.7 109 119 1.09 
1916 45G,118 178,454 2.6 176 171 .97 
1917 389,956 229,834 1.7 22<1 252 1.15 
1918 556,506 347,624 1.6 236 219 .93 
1919 748,460 203,637 3.7 - SOO 242 .81 
1920 G13,227 230,050 2.7 201 183 .91 
1921 G02,793 216,171 2.8 148 120 .81 
1922 571,459 275,190 2.1 126 113 .90 
1923 55u l 299 204,183 2.7 124 105 .85 
1924 573,563 268,054 2.1 158 135 .85 
1925 400,619 268,081 1.5 165 163 .99 
.1926 631,607 200,606 3.1 151 135 .89 
1927 548,188 326,871 1.7 141 135 .96 
1928 579,066 335,307 1.7 126 112 .89 
1929 586,239 236,978 2.5 130 120 .92 
1930 6n,G05 252,865 2.5 82 76 .93 
1931 825,396 116,278 7.1 71 47 .66 
1932 491,795 265,132 1.9 61 51 .84 
19U3 376,518 175,165 2.1 91 88 .07 
1934 437,%3 88,430 5.0 116 98 .84 
1935 465,319 161,025 2.9 126 105 .83 
193G 519,874 106,892 4.9 147 121 .82 
1937 685,824 189,852 3.6 128 111 .87 
1938 688,133 243,5G9 2.8 79 70 .89 
1939 569,741 181,694 3.1 97 74 .76 
1940 588,802 223,572 2.6 90 82 .91 
1941 G71,293 274,644 2.4 110 112 1.02 
1942 703,253 278,074 2.5 129 126 .98 
Source: USDA Agricultural Statistics, 1943, pp. 10 and 22, and earlier iosues. 
If the situation were reversed the next year, and spring wheat yields -
were low. there would be no carryover of spring wheat for millers to draw 
upon. Even if this did not create difficulties with the technical milling 
formulas, it would incl'ease the distances over which wheat would be shipped 
from the different producing areas to the different milling areas. 
A partial solution to this problem could be worked out along the follow-
ing liucs: 
'Villter wlwat production ranges from one and a half times as great 
as spring wheat production in some years to more than seven times as great 
ill others. On tho average, it is about three times as great. In addition, the 
winter wheat harvest comes one or two months earlier than the spring 
wheat harvest. The final loan rate for winter wheat would have to be set 
abont June 1, while the spring wheat crop was still in the making. It 
would be set at a :lovel inversely proportional to the yield of winter wheat 
that year-as closely as that yield could be determined just before harvest. 
That would take care of about 75 percent of the total wheat crop. Then 
as the spring wheat crop came to maturity, its rate would be set inversely 
and proportionally to the yield of spring wheat, but only up to the point 
where the rate would not differ from tile winter loan rate by more than its 
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normal (free-market) relation to the winter wheat prices in view of the 
relation between the relative. sizes of the two crops that year_ 
In years when both crops were about equally large or small, this 
arrangement would impose no limitation on either rate. In other years 
it would limit the extent to which the spring wheat rate could differ from 
the winter wlleat rate. Tliis would mean that the income to spring wheat 
growers could not always be kept constant, but would vary to some extent 
as the variations in the yield of winter wheat differed from the variations 
in the yield of spring wheat. The variation in income would be less than 
the variation under the present unvarying loan rate (unvarying in response 
to variations in yields) and would affect only the spring wheat growers-
only 01le-'f01lrth of the total wheat growers. The incomes of the remaining 
tlu'ee-fourths (the winter wheat growers) would be completely stabilized, 
except for variations in demand. 
PSYOHOLOG ICAL DIFFICULTIES 
Probably the greatest shortcoming of the varying loan rate proposal 
is psychological. Many farmers might ilot feel satisfied with a final rate 
different from the original basic rate. Certainly a good deal of public 
discussion would be required before the purposes of the two different rates 
would be generally understood_ This problem would be serious enough in 
tIle winter wheat area where the rate would vary inYersely and proportion-
ally with yield; it would be still more serious in the spring wheat area, 
where tho variation in the rate would be complicated in some years by the 
relations between the sizes of the winter and spring wheat crops. Legisla-
tors might hesitate either to leave administrators free to put such a system 
into effect, or to write it into legislation themselves. The proposal requires 
further discussion, both in order to simplify and otherwise improve it, and 
in order to bring it to the stage of public awareness which would be required 
before its a!loption coul!l be considered in any case. 
